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Abstract—There are numerous schemes to generically 
signature artifacts. We specifically consider how to circumvent 
signatures based on imphash. Imphash is used to signature 
Portable Executable (PE) files and an imphash of a PE file is an 
MD5 digest over all the symbols that PE file imports. Imphash has 
been used in numerous cases to accurately tie a PE file seen in one 
environment to PE files in other environments, although each of 
these PE files’ contents was different. An argument made for 
imphash is that alteration of imphashes of derived PE file artifacts 
is unlikely since it is an expensive process, such that you will need 
to either modify the source code and recompile or relink in a 
different order. Nevertheless, we present a novel algorithm that 
generates derivative PE files such that its imphash is different 
from the original PE file. This straightforward algorithm 
produces feasible solutions that defeat approaches relying on the 
impash algorithm to signature PE files. 
Keywords—portable executable, import hash, imphash, first 
thunk 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Incident Response and infrastructure teams want to 
efficiently detect, disrupt, and prevent threat groups running 
malware on enterprise devices. Tracking a threat group's file 
artifacts assists in identifying their attack campaigns. One well-
known scheme used to track threat groups’ backdoors is 
imphash [1]. Imphash (for "import hash") is a signature scheme 
that identifies portable executable (PE) files' imports uniquely, 
and has been used in numerous cases (e.g., [2][3][6][7][8]) to 
accurately tie a threat group’s backdoor PE file seen in one 
environment to backdoor PE files in other environments even 
though each of these files’ contents was different. Although the 
commonly-held belief is that any solution to avoid imphash 
signatures is time-consuming and expensive for malware 
authors, necessitating malware authors to modify source code 
and recompile or relink in a different order to generate variants, 
we present a novel algorithm that generates derivative PE files 
each having an imphash different from the original PE file. This 
proposed algorithm demonstrates that using imphash schemes to 
track threat groups’ PE files is not viable. 
A. Related Work 
Information Technology (IT) and Incident Response (IR) teams 
who defend enterprise systems prefer signature schemes that 
are inexpensive to compute but prohibitively expensive for 
malware authors to defeat. Similarly, malware authors prefer 
signature avoidance techniques that inexpensively transform 
the original file artifact but are prohibitively expensive for 
defenders to signature. 
 
There are multiple schemes to signature artifacts. A 
straightforward approach is to produce a message digest, such 
as MD5, SHA1, SHA256, etc., over the content of a file. Any 
change to the file’s content yields a new message digest, and 
this new message digest has no similarity to the original file’s 
message digest. There are locality-sensitive hashing algorithms 
that produce hashes such that the distance between the hashes 
will be small if the files’ contents are similar to each other. 
Other approaches to signature PE files involve checking if the 
program database (pdb) path are the same or if the timestamp 
the linker stored in the file is the same. Imphash, as mentioned 
previously, produces an MD5 digest over all the symbols a PE 
file imports. There are numerous papers reporting usage of 
imphash to cluster malware to same families [2][3]. 
 
B. Portable Executable 
Microsoft designed the Portable Executable (PE) file format for 
use in all their operating systems [4]. This format is loosely 
documented in WINNT.H and thoroughly documented in [5], 
and describes all the pieces necessary to run code encapsulated 
inside a file employing this format. Windows executables such 
as EXEs, DLLs, SYSs, etc. all are files following this format. 
The Import Table, the Import Address Table, and the Base 
Relocation Table are of particular interest. 
 
Each PE file begins with an IMAGE_DOS_HEADER struc-
ture, which contains the offset to the IMAGE_NT_HEADERS 
structure. The IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER structure in 
IMAGE_NT_HEADERS contains data directories storing off-
sets to the import table, import address table, and the base relo-
cation table in the PE file. 
 
1) Import Table 
The import table describes all the symbols the PE file uses 
implicitly and the modules in which these symbols reside. For 
example, if your PE file great.exe calls the function 
ole32!CoInitialize implicitly, the import table must contain a 
reference to the module ole32.dll and the symbol CoInitialize. 
When the image of great.exe is loaded for execution, the loader 
shall implicitly load ole32.dll to ensure that the call to 
ole32!CoInitialize by great.exe succeeds. 
 
The import table is an array of image descriptors, one for each 
module the PE implicitly links. The image import descriptor 
contains an offset to the name of the module (e.g., ole32.dll) to 
be imported, as well as the offset to an original first thunk and 
the first thunk. An IMAGE_THUNK_DATA structure 
represents each thunk, and if IMAGE_ORDINAL_FLAG is not 
set in the thunk, IMAGE_THUNK_DATA is an offset to an 
IMAGE_IMPORT_BY_NAME structure containing the sym-
bol name (e.g., CoInitialize) to be imported. 
 
struct IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR 
{ 
    union 
    { 
        DWORD   Characteristics; 
        DWORD   OriginalFirstThunk; 
    }; 
 
    DWORD   TimeDateStamp 
    DWORD   ForwarderChain; 
    DWORD   Name; 
    DWORD   FirstThunk; 
}; 
 
union IMAGE_THUNK_DATA 
{ 
    DWORD ForwarderString; 
    DWORD Function; 
    DWORD Ordinal; 
    DWORD AddressOfData; 
}; 
 
struct IMAGE_IMPORT_BY_NAME 
{ 
    WORD Hint; 
    CHAR Name[1]; 
}; 
Code 1: Import table structures 
2) Import Address Table 
The content of the import address table is identical to the import 
table. However, during binding, the loader updates the entries 
in the import address table to the actual virtual memory 
addresses of the imported symbols. The FirstThunk field in 
IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR points to the first thunk in 
this import address table. 
3) Base Relocation Table 
The base relocation table contains blocks of entries that 
need to be updated should the PE not be loaded at its 
desired base address. 
II. ALGORITHMS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Imphash algorithm 
The earliest references to Imphash appear to be in [1] and 
[6]. Imphash is now widely applied and used to cluster similar 
malware [7]. To generate imphash, iterate over the import table 
and append all the symbols for each module to be imported as 
module.symbol (lowercase) into a string ordered as iterated. 
Finally, compute the MD5 of this string. A simple best-case 
imphash function is presented in pseudocode below. 
function get_imphash(): 
  str = “” 
  for entry in DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT:     
    module_name = lower_case(entry.name).strip_extension() 
    for import in entry.imports: 
      function = import.name 
      str += module_name + “.” + lower_case(function) 
  return md5(str) 
Code 2: Imphash algorithm pseudocode (without exceptional cases) 
This imphash algorithm allows defenders to easily tie 
all the attack campaigns’ PE file artifacts derived from one 
original PE file artifact. Simply adding or updating 
resources or any other data in the PE which do not affect 
implicitly loaded symbols does not change the order of the 
imports. Therefore, this computed imphash is the same for 
all of these PE artifacts. The only way for imphash to be 
different is if the order in which the imported functions 
were used in code had changed, resulting in the linker 
generating a different reordering of the imported symbols. 
Consequently, this makes it expensive for malware 
authors: to generate an artifact to have a different imphash, 
have to reorder the function calls, maybe recompile, and 
relink as described in [1]. The argument made in support 
of imphash [1] is that this algorithm is expensive to defeat 
and alludes that there are not many malware authors to 
care enough to write tools to modify imphash. This second 
conclusion is weak, and the algorithm presented next 
trivially demonstrates how numerous file artifacts can be 
derived, each with an imphash different from the original 
PE file. 
B. Breaking-Impash algorithm 
Given a PE file E with imphash e, transform E to a new PE 
file ET such that ET now has imphash eT, where e ≠eT but 
functionally, E and ET must be one and the same. The algorithm 
shall transform the PE file without any requirement for access to 
the source code, or program database, or require recompilation 
or relinking. 
thunk_data = []        # vector of (orig_thunk.addressofdata, thunk) 
thunk_data_copy = []   # holds duplicate of thunk_data 
original_to_new = {}   # map<firstthunk, firstthunk> 
 
for entry in DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT: 
   for import in entry.imports: 
       thunk_data.append((import.original_thunk.addressofdata, 
                       import.firstthunk)) 
 
thunk_data_copy = thunk_data.clone() 
random_shuffle(thunk_data) 
for i in range(thunk_data.length): 
   original_to_new[thunk_data[i].second] = thunk_data_copy[i].second 
 
for entry in DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT: 
   i = 0 
   for import in entry.imports: 
       import.original_thunk.addressofdata = 
           import.firstthunk.addressofdata = thunk_data[i].first 
       i = i+1 
 
for relocation_block in DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC: 
    for patch_address in relocation_block: 
        lookup = patch_address - imagebase 
        value = original_to_new.find(lookup) 
        if value: 
            relocation_block[patch_address] = value + imagebase 
 
Code 3: Breaking-Imphash algorithm pseudocode 
The Breaking-Impash algorithm iterates over the import 
table and for each module stores a pair 
(OriginalThunk.AddressOfCode, Thunk) into an array A for 
each symbol’s original thunk and thunk. The algorithm 
duplicates this array A to AT and randomizes the order of the 
elements in AT. The algorithm then iterates over the import table 
again, and this time updates the original thunks and thunks to the 
values in AT. Updating the thunks updates the import address 
table. Updating the import table and import address table is not 
sufficient: Code references the thunks and expects the 
corresponding virtual memory addresses for the imported 
symbols to be in those thunks. Therefore, after the 
randomization step for AT. the algorithm stores a mapping of AT 
to A in a map M. When the entire import table and import address 
table have been processed the algorithm iterates over the entries 
in the base relocation table, searching for these addresses as keys 
in the map M. If an address is found in M, the algorithm replaces 
the value with corresponding map value. The saved derived PE 
file artifact now behaves exactly as the original PE file artifact 
but has a different imphash. 
III. RESULT 
A. Time-complexity 
Assuming there are n symbols, the cost to randomize and 
update the thunks is linear and thus, O(n). We also need to store 
a mapping M between the thunk original offsets and new offsets. 
Let’s assume M is a red-black tree. Therefore, storing n offsets 
shall be O(n lg n). We will update the base relocation table, 
which contains m entries. Therefore, searching m entries in M 
shall cost O(m lg n). Our total cost is: O(n lg n) + O(m lg n) + 
O(n). The expectation is that m >> n, as more addresses exist 
needing relocation than just the n thunks. Therefore, this 
algorithm is bounded O(m lg n). 
Assuming there are n symbols, we can have n! possible 
orderings. So, if we randomly choose an order following 
Gaussian distribution, the chances of a PE having same imphash 
as previous is 1/n!. 
B. Demonstration with example 
For demonstration, we construct an example PE file, 
great.exe, which implicitly imports three functions CoInitialize, 
CoCreateGuid, and CoUninitialize from ole32.dll, and 
kernel32.dll. In a successful execution, the implementation calls 
CoInitialize, CoCreateGuid, and CoUninitialize in sequence. 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <windows.h> 
 
int main() { 
    HRESULT hr = CoInitialize(NULL); 
    GUID = { 0 }; 
    CoCreateGuid(&guid); 
    printf("Hello, World! %x\n", guid.Data1); 
    if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) 
        CoUninitialize(); 
    return 0; 
} 
 
Code 4: great.exe source code 
The imphash for this great.exe is: 
5dc63c6fd3a8ce23292cbe13b6713f16. The IMAGE IMPORT 
DESCRIPTOR for ole32.dll is shown below in CFF Explorer 
for great.exe. Notice that the order of the symbols in the 
descriptor is: CoUninitialize, CoCreateGuid, and CoInitialize. 
 
Figure 1: IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR for symbols imported from 
ole32.dll 
If you run great.exe via WinDbg, notice that the loader has 
stored the address of ole32!CoInitialize in the thunk 
great!__imp_CoInitialize. Therefore, the instruction call dword 
ptr [great!__imp__CoInitialize] results in the execution of the 
function ole32!CoInitialize. 
 
Figure 2: __imp__CoInitialize thunk holds address of ole32!CoInitialize 
This is the disassembly of great.exe with symbols in IDAPro. 
Notice the call instructions shown as they correctly refer to the 
imports. 
 
Figure 3: Disassembly of great.exe with program database in IDAPro 
Now, using the Breaking-Imphash algorithm described, we 
transform great.exe, resulting in transformed.exe with imphash 
c489844a22db2fe8ec5608c8de7473bd. In IDAPro, given that 
transformed.exe references great.exe’s program database file for 
symbols, the view is interesting. Observe that CoCreateGuid 
resides where CoInitialize is expected, CoUninitialize resides 
where CoCreateGuid is expected, and CoInitialize resides where 
CoUninitialize is expected. 
The IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR for ole32.dll in 
transformed.exe is shown in CFF Explorer in Figure 5. Notice 
that the order now is CoCreateGuid, CoInitialize, and 
CoUninitialize. The order of the symbols imported from 
kernel32.dll was also changed and this is in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 4: Disassembly of transformed.exe with great.exe’s program database 
 
Figure 5: transformed.exe’s IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR for symbols 
imported from ole32.dll 
Now, if we look at the disassembly in WinDbg, notice that 
the loader is storing ole32!CoInitialize in the thunk which 
originally contained great!__imp_CoCreateGuid. 
 
Figure 6: __imp__CoCreateGuid thunk holds ole32!CoInitialize 
This great.exe example import 66 symbols from kernel32.dll 
and 3 from ole32.dll, and we can derive 69! different artifacts 
each with a unique imphash for this artifact. Note that 69! is 
larger than the 2128 (since imphash is MD5). That is, for 
great.exe, we can derive more artifacts than all available 
imphash values. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Breaking-Imphash algorithm is a feasible solution to 
generate derived PE files with imphash different from the 
original PE file. The algorithm requires the operating system to 
not load the PE file at its preferred base address in order to 
perform relocation. Relocation of PE is standard: Operating 
systems perform relocations for security or if another module is 
already loaded at the preferred base address. However, 
relocation can be disabled, for example, if 
IMAGE_FILE_RELOCS_STRIPPED flag is set in the PE file. 
This specific case can also be accommodated: Write an 
algorithm to inspect the .text section and identify all the call 
dword ptr instructions (ff 15 xx xx) that reference thunks. 
Replace these xx xx xx xx addresses with the updated thunk 
offsets. This approach is slightly more involved but not 
infeasible. 
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